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BOOK REVIEWS
TREATIES VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION. Roger Lea MacBride. Caldwell, Idaho:
The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1955. Pp. 89.
Roger Lea MacBride is a young graduate of Harvard Law School with a fine
flair for pamphleteering and some promise as a scholar. He has apparently studied
treaty practices in the United States, and in Treaties Versus The Constitution his
notions on the subject are publicly bared.
At the outset, author MacBride introduces a number of examples of treaties
which, he says, testify that strict adherence to the standing constitutional treaty
provisions' might well result in the enlargement of federal powers. He cites a
familiar group including the Bogota Treaty of 1950, The UN Charter, The UN
Genocide Treaty, the "Covenant on Human Rights", the Warsaw Convention,
and the NATO Treaty.
While suggesting the potential evil of these international agreements, at no
time is he able to establish that the Congress has acted under the color of a treaty
to expand the power of the federal government beyond Constitutional limits. He
points to the Warsaw Convention- and limitation upon the rights of recovery
against international air carriers, but fails to note that the Congress, utilizing its
power to regulate foreign commerce, could have enacted a similar statute without
benefit of treaty had it wished so to do. In this connection, MacBride's thesis that
the Executive Department operates under a theory that "A treaty empowers the
President to commit the country to war without Congressional declaration even
though the United States is not directly attacked,"3 seems the grossest perversion
of the work.
His failure to comprehend the nature of modern warfare-the extension of
modern politics-is revealed in his opening remarks on the power to declare war.
"It is perfectly clear," the author announces, "that if the United States is attacked,
the President has constituted authority ... to retaliate. It is equally clear ... that
if the United States is not directly attacked, only Congress may declare war.' 4
The relationship between the Congressional Act of declaring war5 and the
President, in his capacity as commander-in-chief,0 directing the armed forces of
the United States to repel a hostile penetration of national soil, is not only consti-
1. U. S. CONST., art. II, § 2; art. III, § 2; art. VI.
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rights Relating to International
Transportation by Air, signed at Warsaw, Poland, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 STAT. 3,000
(effective July 31, 1934).
3. R. L. MACBRIDE, TREATIES VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION, p. 18.
4. Loo. cit.
5. U. S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
6. Ibid., art II, § 2.
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tutionally vague, but given the conditions of Mid-Twentieth Century battle,
increasingly meaningless. When the Constitution was drafted, the techniques of
war not only implied the opportunity to debate the interests of involvement, but
the military defense of the nation did not rest upon such devices as permanent
naval and air bases in friendly or allied countries ringing the perimeter of a
suspected source of hostility. What is dearly important in defensive strategy today
is not merely whether the territorial limits of the United States are invaded, but
whether the overseas bases also remain inviolate. If a potential enemy attacks a
country wherein lies an overseas American air base, that attack must be construed
by the President of the United States as a direct attack upon the United States, and
his Constitutional obligation thereupon to order his armed forces to safeguard the
nation lies beyond the shade of doubt.
It is not the treaty with the base granting nation or ally that has created his
authority to act, however. As Commander-in-Chief, he must extend his powers to
meet, in Dicey's words, "the law of paramount necessity." Furthermore, his inability
to declare war has never, and does not today, deprive him of that executive discre-
tion necessary to determine the proper means of defending the nation when
attacked, nor can the particular conditions of modern war be used as an excuse to
negate that discretion.
Author MacBride is at his best when he dispassionately describes the skeins
of history that have been woven into the cloth of Constitutional practice with
respect to treaties. His summation of discussion on Article VI by the Federal
Convention is brief but adequate, and his recapitulation of the primary treaty cases
is well done. It is only when he attempts to skim some meaning from the words
and events which he describes that he tends to leave serious scholarship in the
backwash. Referring to recent treaty and foreign policy cases. 7 MacBride concludes
that, "The position of the Supreme Court appears to have undergone a profound
change in the last thirty-five years."s Using the "political question" rule as an
excuse, he continues, the Court has repudiated the "Marbr7y v. Madison" doctrine
where applied to constitutional questions-the Court is only saying that the final
determination of the constitutionality of the act involved is left to the actor."10
MacBride leaves his reader with the clear implication that the Twentieth
Century Court attitude with respect to treaties is the product of a conscious will on
the part of the Court to reshape a significant area of constitutional law. This
7. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920); United States v. Pink, 315 U. S.
203 (1942); Chicago and Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steamship, 333 U. S. 103
(1948); United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
8. MACBRIDE, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 60.
9. 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. MACBRIDE, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 61.
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neatly avoids consideration of the reasons why the Court has applied the label
"political question" to an increasingly large area of foreign policy determination.
Perhaps the best reading of the term "political question" is that it is an area in
which the Court deigns not to enter because it knows, on balance of all factors,
that it has no reasonable expectation of seeing its decisions enforced. The judges
are students of Realpolitik as well as law. The extension of the President's power
as chief negotiator and leader in the field of foreign policy has grown apace with
the nation's involvement in international commitments. The Court will not, in
its wisdom, restrain the Executive Branch in its treaty operations which now, far
more than in the Nineteenth Century, are necessary for the preservation of the
safety of the United States, nor-and this far more significant---could it, in most
cases, hope to upset a treaty if the President was determined to enforce it.
Judicial impotence in the field of foreign affairs is an element which Mr. MacBride
cares not to mention.
One cannot but sympathize with the author's concern that a vast expansion of
federal powers is possible-he never says imminent-if the treaty making power
is not in some fashion restrained. Yet .wars and depressions have wrought their
mark on the Constitution. Is it to be supposed that numerous alliances and heavy
commitments in international affairs would not do likewise? And the author is far
from establishing that treaties have rendered the Constitution a vestigial remnant
of a pleasant, though by-gone, era.
Mr. MacBride concludes his book with a brief explanation of proposed
Constitutional amendments designed to clarify the treaty provisions. He skirts a
protracted discussion of that portion of the Bricker Amendment which provides
that an unconstitutional treaty shall be held unconstitutional, but he levels his
defensive fire to cover the famous "which" clause." The essence of MacBride's
thesis is that the clause would rarely be invoked, "necessary only in' the rare
instance of a treaty beyond the federal legislative competence-dealing with a
subject not traditionally one with which foreign affairs are concerned."'1  Aside
from the fact that this completely destroys the first proposition of the book, that
Congress has been doing all sorts of things under color of treaties which it had no
Constitutional business doing, the thesis neatly begs the question, for what is not
today a subject within the realm of foreign affairs may tomorrow be, and the Court
still lacks a standard for determining what is a "treaty beyond federal legislative
competence." It cannot be argued that racial segregation was fifty years ago a
feature of American life, which in the context of international affairs, put the
11. The current version: "Sec. 1. A provision of a treaty or other interna-
tional agreement which conflicts with this Constitution, or which is not made in
pursuance thereof, shall not be the supreme law of the land nor be of any force
or affect." 101 CONG. REc. 81 (daily ed. 1955).
12. MAcBRIDE, Op. cit. supra, note 3, at 83.
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nation in jeopardy of its national existence. Fifty years hence, it may not be
possible to argue the contrary. Leaving the Constitution in peace on the subject
of treaties may be politically unpopular today, nor is it tenable that no improvement
through amendment is possible, but Senator Bricker's proposal, not to mention
author MacBride's substitute amendment, lead from the premise of reduced
American involvement in world politics and the likely responsibilities such
involvement will bring. Comment on this assumption seems superfluous.
PAUL A. PFRETZSCHNER
Associate Professor of Government
Lafayette College
